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ARGUMENT 
"You know, I still don 't know how it would have happened; so it's 
kind of difficult, it being how would you make clear that the jury 
wasn't going to find a 30-acre parcel, you know?" 
Hon. Chas. Hosack- Tr. 8/29/12 at p. 47. 
I. THE TRIAL COURTS TREATMENT OF THE LARGER PARCEL WAS IN 
ERROR. 
Determining the larger parcel is a factual inquiry, but it must nevertheless be made in 
adherence to the law. In its treatment of the larger parcel question, the Trial Court erred, ruling 
that the larger parcel conclusion by Grathol' s valuation witnesses was unsupportable and 
"contrary to Idaho law." This legal error tainted the Trial Court's consideration of the evidence 
at trial and ultimately led to erroneous and unsupported conclusions of fact. The errors in law, 
like a pebble tumbling downhill, led to an avalanche of erroneous factual finding - all flowing 
from the Trial Court's premise that the larger parcel must encompass the entirety of Grathol's 
property. The prejudicial effect of this false premise, combined with evidence offered at trial by 
ITD, did not serve to rebut severance ("consequential) damages to the remaining property, as in 
the chief purpose of the larger parcel inquiry; but instead was used by ITD to achieve a value of 
the take area based on impermissible averaging of excess and unaffected ground. 
Grathol' s theory of the case, and all of its evidence at trial, was that the highest and best 
use of its property would not involve a singular, cohesive development. While the property will 
eventually be put to commercial uses (plural), those uses are not integrated or dependent upon 
one another. Therefore, valuing the property as a single unit was, and is, inappropriate. 
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Grathol's witnesses treated the property as though divided to the east and west of the proposed 
Sylvan Road "corridor" which it clearly will be in the foreseeable future. The property to the 
east of Sylvan Road was entirely un-impacted by the take and thus no severance damages 
alleged. 
The western 30 acres of property, however, represents an "independent economic unit" 
which can, and will, be developed and utilized as prime commercial property fronting on, and 
visible from, two adjacent highways. The western 30 acres form an economic unit based on 
location at the lighted intersection of two busy highways, its suitability and optimal size for 
development, and its visibility from the adjacent roads. From those 30 acres, ITD's take of 
16.314 acres damaged the western economic unit. That is, both the take itself and the 
construction ofITD's proposed improvements caused damage to that western 30 acres - but did 
not damage the easternmost portion of the greater property. The western 30 acres suffered 
considerable harm (beyond the mere reduction in size) through the impacts of the taking (i.e. -
the elevated highway design, the loss of the signalized intersection, the increased "pass-by" 
speed of the traveling public and the eventual "re-split" of the property for the Sylvan frontage 
road). Further, the new highway alignment separates a 3.87 acre portion of the west 30 from the 
rest of the property, significantly increasing the cost to extend utilities to that (western) 
remainder. In fact, the cost of extending wet and dry utilities under the new highway made the 
west 3.87 acres all but unusable. All of these impacts constitute compensable severance 
damages. 
2 
ITD argued that the entire 57 acres had to be treated as the larger parcel. ITD's 
appraisers opined a per-acre value for the entire property and then simply apportioned that value, 
pro-rata to the 16.314 acres taken. ITD did not recognize any differences in value for any 
portions of the entire 57 acre tract of land, claiming instead that every square foot of Grathol's 
ground was worth exactly the same amount regardless of its location. Contrary to its arguments 
on appeal, however, ITD presented no evidence at trial that the use(s) of the western and eastern 
portions of the property would be integrated, or that the value of the western portion was 
dependent in any manner upon the use of the eastern portion. ITD elected not to cross-examine 
Grathol's engineer Jim Coleman when he testified that the sewer infrastructure designed for the 
property would be located entirely on the western 30 acres and integrated into the development. 
ITD also chose not to present any evidence to support its notion that an integrated use of all 57 
acres was essential. The Trial Court acknowledged ITD's failure to present evidence of this 
issue, yet it inexplicably disregarded Grathol' s evidence on the same issue. R. at p. 12 7 4. 
ITD's valuation simply averaged in the excess, distant and (logically) less valuable part 
of the Grathol property against the undoubtedly higher value of the take area immediately 
adjacent to the highway. ITD argued that its valuation method was the only accepted method 
and managed to somehow convince the Trial Court that Grathol's larger parcel theory was 
"barred" by law. However, Idaho law has never restricted a property owner's right to present its 
valuation evidence and other jurisdictions have soundly rejected the Trial Court's "one-size fits 
all" valuation approach. Because the Trial Court refused to even consider the evidence, stating 
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that it would not have allowed a jury to consider Grathol's 30 acre "larger parcel," it committed 
reversible error, leading to an unsupported determination of just compensation. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN RULING THAT 
GRA THOL'S APPROACH TO THE LARGER PARCEL WAS 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The larger parcel is a legal construct employed in (partial) condemnation cases to 
determine what the greater area is from which a taking occurs. It is not a unique concept and its 
use and utility has been recognized in Idaho as well as virtually all other jurisdictions. See e.g., 
State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86 Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963); see also, State Through 
Dept. of Highways v. LeDoux, 184 So.2d 604 (Ct.App. LA 1966); Territ01y by Sharpless v. 
Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.29 979 (1961); State v. Wandermere Co., 89 Wash.App. 369 
(1997); City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2 (2001); Department of Transportation v. 
HP/Meachum Land, 245 Ill.App.3d 252 (1993); State v. Stegmann, 269 So.2d 480 (Ct.App. LA, 
1972); Bland v. Bulloch Cnty., 205 Ga.App. 317,422 S.E.2d 223 (1992). 
The larger parcel valuation theory was created in part to protect a landowner's right to 
receive just compensation where the property taken had no independent utility separate and apart 
from a greater portion of land to which it is connected. It is often used in condemnations 
involving "strip takes" where, for example, a narrow swath of property is needed to widen a road 
but the property taken does not have any discreet, economic value because of its size or shape, 
by reason of the lack of market-driven demand for irregularly shaped or narrow parcels which 
could not be used independently. In those situations, courts have uniformly held that the fair 
market value of such property must be arrived at by considering its use( s) as part of a greater 
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portion of property in order to ascribe some value to it and protect the owner's right to just 
compensation for its loss. However, when the property taken is of such size and character so as 
to be an independent economic unit and its value can be determined without considering the rest 
of the landowner's property, then use of the larger parcel analysis to value the whole property to 
arrive at the market value of the take is not appropriate. It is also inappropriate to use an average 
per-acre/foot (etc) value of the entire property when the facts show that the property has different 
values in different locations. This is exactly what ITD did in this case, despite Idaho's statues 
requiring a valuation of the part taken first, then evaluation of severance damages to the part not 
taken, if any. See, Idaho Code§ 7-711. 
The larger parcel analysis also bears on the determination of severance damages to the 
remainder, when the remainder (not taken) has been harmed either by reason of the take or by the 
improvements made thereon. In order to recover severance damages, a party must show that the 
property taken is a portion of a greater area and that the value and use of the remainder is 
dependent upon its use in connection with the part taken. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain 
Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972). When no severance damages are sought, the use of 
the larger parcel analysis is restricted, and often prohibited, since it can penalize a landowner by 
averaging the value of unaffected acreage against the value of the part taken. The reason for this 
is simple: larger parcels of land typically sell for lower per unit prices than smaller parcels (and 
vice-versa). This is size regression theory. Therefore, strict application of the larger parcel 
theory in some situations could be akin to offsetting benefits to the remainder against the value 
of the take, which is prohibited by Idaho law. 
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In recognition of these competing influences, the larger parcel analysis must be carefully 
tailored to the facts at hand, in order to avoid confusing the separate purposes of the analysis as 
the Trial Court did here. One court aptly described the perils of mixing the separate objectives of 
the larger parcel analysis. Arizona State Land Dept. v. State, 113 Ariz. 125, 547 P.2d 479 
(1976), was an appeal in a partial condemnation action wherein no severance damages were 
sought. The condemnee, State Land Department argued that the value of the land taken must be 
determined by consideration of a 640 acre "larger parcel" based on a statutory restriction on 
maximum size for school trust lands. The State Highway Department convinced the trial court 
that the land taken should be proportionally valued in relation to the whole property of which the 
take was a part; a ranch consisting of 101,000 acres. Id. at 127, 547 P.2d 481. The Arizona 
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence offered by the State 
Land Department based on the 640 acre larger parcel treatment. It found that the legal position 
of the State Highway Department was incorrect because it confused the valuation of the land 
taken with a severance damage analysis. Id. After noting that the take area (109± acres) was not 
a separate, stand alone economic unit and necessarily had to be valued as part of a larger tract of 
land, the Supreme Court held: 
The determination of what constitutes an entire tract m 
circumstances where a part taken from that tract has no 
independent, economic value should not be confused with the 
severance damage concept of the 'larger parcel.' The sole purpose 
of the former inquiry is to discover the market value of the parcel 
taken from a larger area under the same ownership. A. Jahr, Law of 
Eminent Domain s 103, at 139. In contrast, the concern of the 
larger parcel principal is with consequential damages to the residue 
of the condemned property. 
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Id. at 128-29, 547 P.2d 482-83. The Court also observed that once the value of the larger tract of 
land was found, a ratio could be employed to compare the part taken with the remaining tract in 
order to identify whether the separate portions of land had different value characteristics. 
However, that ratio need not be uniform because some portions of land are inherently more 
valuable than others. Id. at 129, 547 P.2d 483.1 Because the trial court limited the evidence of 
the take area as being part of a 101,000 acre larger parcel, for which no severance damages were 
claimed, the trial court committed reversible error. 
The holding and reasoning of Arizona is instructive here. It demonstrates the tangible 
risk of effectively penalizing an owner merely for having a large tract of land, a portion of which 
will be taken, and a portion of which will be damaged. When a tract has different values and 
characteristic; simply averaging the value of the excess and unaffected acreage against the most 
valuable part (that is being taken) to determine the market value of the take, can mean the 
property owner will not receive just compensation. 
In this case, there was no dispute that the eastern part of the Grathol property was 
unaffected by the take and no severance damages were sought for it. Just as in Arizona, 
1 Several courts have flatly rejected a uniform approach to valuation. See, Bland v. Bulloch 
County, 205 Ga.App. 317, 422 S.E.2d 223 (1992) ( error in restricting charge to jury to a pro rata 
valuation when value or part taken is not dependent upon the size of the whole); Wilmer v. 
Fulton County School District, 226 Ga.App. 884, 487 S.E.2d 709 (Ct.App.1997) (rejecting pro-
rata valuations failing to account for different values of property); Commonwealth v. Hall, 353 
S.W.2d 548 (Ky.Ct.App. 1962) (rejecting argument of uniform pro rata valuation); State v. 
Moyse, 151 So.2d 149 La.Ct.App. 1963) (finding no objection to dividing property according to 
value for valuation as opposed to pro rata method). 
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Grathol's evidence established the "economic unit as a portion of the property less than the 
whole, yet greater than the take area. Severance damages were not sought for the excess land to 
the east (which coincidentally was the least valuable part of the 57 acres), yet ITD convinced the 
Trial Court to utilize a valuation method of averaging the least valuable portion of the 57 acres 
against the most valuable portion, in order to arrive at a lower pro-rata value for the part taken. 
Just as in Arizona, the Trial Court erred when it refused to consider Grathol's "larger parcel" 
and, more importantly in, ruling that such approach is prohibited by law, which it most certainly 
is not. Idaho law requires the take to be evaluated first, then to consider severance damages, if 
any. ITD and the Trial Court mixed the two considerations. 
It is apparent from the Trial Court's conclusions, that the Court erroneously believed the 
law to strictly require an analysis of all acreage, whether impacted or not, and whether severance 
damages were sought or not. 
Grathol's evidence, had it been fairly considered by the Court, was largely unchallenged. 
It showed that the 16 acre take was part of a 30 acre independent economic unit of land located 
west of the Sylvan Road corridor, and that it derived its value as part of that 30 acre "larger 
parcel" without regard for the property to the east of Sylvan. Grathol sought severance damages 
only for the remainder of this 30 acre economic unit. Because ITD's take (16.314 acres) was 
not, in and of itself, an independent economic unit, the Trial Court had to undertake the larger 
parcel analysis by considering contiguity, ownership and prospective integrated uses of the 30 
acres. However, at ITD's urging, the Trial Court confabulated the larger parcel analysis, when it 
insisted on including additional and unaffected property to the east for which no severance 
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damages were sought. The Trial Court incorrectly rejected Grathol's theory as being contrary to 
law and utilized the entire property to arrive at a pro-rata value of the take. The Trial Court did 
so because it had already decided, in spite of evidence, law and logic that the larger parcel must 
be the entire property. This was an error and a profoundly prejudicial error, at that. 
The impact of the Trial Court's erroneous legal conclusions cannot be overstated. Judge 
Hosack obviously struggled with the larger parcel question from the very beginning. The 
Judge's comments at the pre-trial conference reveal his predisposition: 
So, I mean, normally you'd come in here, you have a larger parcel. 
That's not a methodology thing by the appraiser. That's a question 
that's resolved by the jury. It's a question of fact. And the fact that 
Mr. Sherwood likes to divide it up into 30 acres is neither here nor 
there. 
I understand the reasoning of Mr. Sherwood as an appraiser. 
What's that got to do with the legal definition, the factual finding 
of what the larger parcel is? Nothing. 
How in heaven's name would a competent appraiser appraise a 
parcel that's imaginary? 
Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. Ip. 66, ll.12-18,pp. 67-68, ll. 20-23,pp. 68-69, ll.18-19. 
But the law requires that the parcel that is a contiguous parcel be, 
in fact, treated by the fact finder as a contiguous parcel. I would 
instruct the jury that the fact that an appraiser has come up with a 
development scheme that parses off 30 acres that could be 
developed more readily is of absolutely no relevance to their 
determination of the larger parcel. In essence I don't see how there 
would be any evidence any trier of fact could find the larger parcel 
to be anything other than 57 acres. 
Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. 1 p. 80, ll. 8-18 (emphasis added). The Trial Court's written Decision shows how 
this predisposition manifested itself: "creating a hypothetical parcel within the parent tract to 
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constitute the larger parcel for valuing the part taken (that is where the part taken is only a 
portion of the hypothetical parcel) is not recognized in existing case law." R. at p. 1276. 
Even after the Decision was issued and this appeal commenced, the Trial Court continued 
to editorialize on the question, stating that Grathol's approach was "prohibited" and "directly 
contrary to Idaho case law ... " even though it acknowledged that considering the western 30 acre 
larger parcel as an economic unit was "very logical and a very good plan." Tr. 8/29/12, p. 42, ll. 
5-11. 
In this case, the Trial Court's treatment of the larger parcel issue effectively allowed ITD 
to capitalize on the size of Grathol's parent tract to arrive at a lower per unit value for the take. 
Refusing to give honest consideration of Grathol's larger parcel theory, which the Trial Court 
found was logical, credible and supported by the market data, was clear error.2 The Trial Court 
simply believed it was required to reject Grathol's approach and thus refused to consider the 
evidence at trial. 
Other jurisdictions have addressed the mischief of allowing a condemnor to designate a 
"parent" tract for the "larger parcel" analysis, noting that averaging of the excess acreage against 
the value of the part taken is not permissible when the remaining acreage is unaffected by the 
take. In State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366 (1966), the Texas Supreme Court considered the larger 
parcel question where the State condemned 14.9 acres of a 103 acre tract. The landowners 
waived severance damages and motioned in lirnine to prevent the State from valuing the take 
2 R. atp. 1281. 
10 
based on an average per-acre valuation of the entire 103 acre tract. Id. at 369. The State's 
witnesses admitted that if they had appraised the take area as a single tract of land, their appraisal 
would have been higher. The trial court granted the motion in limine to ensure landowners 
received fair consideration of the land taken. Id. at 369-70. The State chose not to present value 
testimony of the condemned land as a whole unit and the jury award reflected the higher value 
based on landowners' economic unit theory. The State appealed the trial court's refusal to allow 
its witnesses to testify as to value for the take based on the aggregate (average) of the lower 
priced remaining acreage. Id. at 374-75. 
The Meyer court recognized the pitfalls inherent in the State's approach and declined to 
follow any holding which would lead to acceptance of a method that would deprive a landowner 
of his property without full constitutional compensation. Id. at 375. The Meyer court recognized 
the obvious: that the part taken had a significantly higher per-acre market value than the land not 
being condemned which lay further back from the highway. Id. The State argued that after the 
take, the remainder would be benefited and might increase in value by reason of the newly 
created frontage (i.e. - "slide-back theory"). The Meyer court rejected these arguments, because 
such an approach would offset the alleged increased value of the remainder (to which no 
severance was sought) against the value of the take. Such off-sets are specifically prohibited. Id. 
at 375-76.3 The Meyer Court held that when damages to the entire remainder are not implicated, 
averaging the larger parcel unit value to arrive at the value of the take is inappropriate. 
3 Just as they are under Idaho Code § 7-711(3). 
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In another Texas case, State v. Windham, 837 S.W.2d 73 (1992), the Court agam 
addressed the larger parcel "economic unit" concept. In Windham, the State condemned 
approximately 2 acres consisting of a 110 foot deep strip out of a 19 acre tract for highway 
widening. Prior to trial, landowner waived his right to seek damages to the remainder of his 
16.88 acres, but designated a larger area (than the 2 acre take) consisting of 3.84 acres 
immediately adjacent to the existing highway as the economic unit (larger parcel) for the basis of 
the take's value. Id. at 74. The landowner filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence by the 
State of the valuation based on a pro rata valuation of the whole property, arguing that the 
averaging method would be unconstitutional. The trial court excluded the State's valuation, and 
the jury returned a verdict based on valuing the take area as a portion of a 3. 84 acre larger parcel 
not a 19 acre larger parcel. 
On appeal, the Windham Court recognized that when a severed parcel can be considered 
an independent economic unit, its market value can be determined without reference to a 
remainder. However, when the portion of the land taken could not be considered an independent 
economic unit reflecting the highest and best use of land, the market value must necessarily be 
determined by considering some portion or all of the remainder in order to comprise an 
economic unit. Id. at 76. When the highest and best use is disputed, it was for the jury to decide 
which use is appropriate and what evidence of valuation is correct for the market value of the 
take. Id. The Windham court ruled that the jury was to consider all the uses to which the 
property "is reasonably adaptable and for which it is, or in all reasonable probability will 
become, available within the foreseeable future." Id. at 77. 
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If Windham is permitted to present evidence of the market value of 
the part taken utilizing a larger tract than that sought by the 
condemning authority based on its theory of highest and best use 
of the property, then the State should be allowed to present 
evidence based on its competing theory of the higher and best use 
for the property. 
Id. The Windham court recognized that a prior case ruled that the condemnee retained the 
absolute right to designate the appropriate economic unit when not seeking damages to non-
affected remainder. Id., (discussing, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d 
466 (Tex.Civ.App.1976)). However the Windham Court found that the trial judge erred in 
precluding the State's method of valuation, ruling that the landowner alone could not define the 
suitable economic unit when the uses were in dispute.4 Windham and Meyer are not unique to 
Texas law or otherwise isolated anomalies. 
A similar result was reached in City of Westminster v. Jefferson Center Associates, 958 
P.2d 495, 1997 WL 671951 (Colo.Ct.App. 1997). In Westminster, the City condemned an 
easement across four parcels of property for a pipeline. The parcels were vacant, undeveloped 
and un-platted land, zoned for industrial and commercial uses. They were being held for future 
development but used for grazing livestock. Id. at 497. The City's expert valued the easement on 
a per acre basis as part of the whole parcel. Id. Landowner's appraiser valued the per acre value 
of the easement based upon only the portion of the parcel in which the easement was located. Id. 
Landowner's expert opined that the portion of the parcels through which the easement actually 
4This result was upheld in In re: State, 355 S.W.3d 611. 54 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 1754 (2011), holding 
that the State does not have the power to constrain the owner's evidence of competing 
conceptions of the economic unit by which the take should be valued. 
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ran was worth substantially more than the balance of the parcels, primarily because that portion 
was immediately adjacent to a highway and would be developed earlier and at less cost than the 
rest of the property. The commissioners adopted the opinions of the City's expert and the 
landowner appealed, arguing that the City's appraiser did not use a correct valuation method. 
On appeal, the Westminster court recognized two approaches to a partial takings 
appraisal. The first method included the value of the take plus the difference in the remainder 
before versus after the taking. The second method involves comparing the value of the entire 
tract before the taking against the value of the remaining tract after the taking. Id. at 500. The 
Westminster court recognized that Colorado law mandated the use of the first method for 
highway right-of-way purposes because the rule requiring that the portion taken was to be valued 
as a part of a parcel was to protect the landowner. Id. at 501, citing, Department of 
Transportation v. HPIA1eachum Land Ltd. Partnership, 245 Ill.App.3d 252, 614 N.E.2d 485 
(1993). The Westminster court noted that the City's "averaging" approach did not separately 
account for a drainage area which affected the value of the take. Id. at 502. However, the court 
held that it was not error to consider the City's approach "so long as the parcel is sufficiently 
uniform and that method of valuation is not detrimental to the owner because it does not 
accurately value the property actually taken at its highest and best use." Id. ( emphasis added). 
The determination of whether the parcel is sufficiently uniform to 
be amenable to having a portion of it so valued, and whether such a 
valuation method is detrimental to the owner by not valuing the 
portion taken at its highest and best use, are questions of fact for 
the fact finder. Therefore, we hold that evidence of the value of the 
part taken as a part of the whole is admissible along with other 
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evidence and should be accorded so much weight as it deserves by 
the fact -finder. 
Id. The take-away of this holding is that the trial courts must permit both parties to present their 
arguments as to the value, and it is error to preclude one party's approach when the facts and 
evidence support it. 
Numerous jurisdictions have allowed landowners to present their theory of a less-than-
the-whole parent tract being the "larger parcel." See e.g., Dade County v. Mindic Realty, Inc., 
551 So.2d 499 (Dist.Ct.App. Florida 1989); Wilmer v. Fulton County School Dist., 226 Ga.App. 
884,487 S.E.2d 709 (Ct.App. Georgia 1997); US v. Easements upon 104.09 Acres, 442 F.Supp. 
926 (Dist.Ct. Wash. 1977); Merrill Trust Company v. State, 417 A.2d 435 (Maine 1980); State v. 
Silver, 92 N.J. 507, 457 A.2d 463 (1983); Division of Administration v. Jirik, 471 So.2d 549 
(Dist.Ct.App. Florida 1985); State v. Moyse, 151 So.2d 149 (Ct.App. Louisiana 1963); Babinec 
v. State, 512 P.2d 563 (Alaska 1973); People v. Silveira, 236 Cal.App.2d 604 (1965); Tuscon 
Title Ins. Co. v. State, 15 Ariz.App. 452, 489 P.2d 299 (1971); Department of Transportation v. 
HP/Meachum, 245 Ill.App.3d 252, 614 N.E.2d 484 (1993); Spiegelberg v. State, 291 Wis.2d 
601, 717 N.W.2d 641 (2006). 
These cases all inform on how other jurisdictions have properly resolved the competing 
evidentiary theories at issue. While here, the Trial Court was convinced that the law flatly 
precluded a landowner from valuing the take based on a portion of the entire property; it is clear 
from these cases that this methodology is proper in appropriate circumstances. Further, these 
cases all illustrate why a trial court should not limit the ability of a landowner to present its 
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theory of just compensation. These cases show that when there are no claims to severance 
damages to the remainder ( or portions of the remainder), it is reasonable, appropriate and indeed 
mandated that the valuation be based on the economic unit actually impacted by the take. The 
law of eminent domain is, at its essence, the law of what is fair to the property owner. 
Based on the reasoning of these cases, it was not proper to refuse consideration of 
Grathol's valuation theory. Grathol presented evidence that the western 30 (of its 57) acres 
would be put to entirely different types of commercial use when developed, separate from the 
property to the east of the Sylvan corridor. Conversely, ITD argued (without evidence) that the 
highest/best use of the entire property was to be held for speculative future investment purposes. 
It was myopic error for the Trial Court to rule that Grathol's valuation based on the 30 acre 
larger parcel was unsustainable in law. Tr. 8/29/13, p. 40, ll. 7-11. If a landowner is not 
permitted to unilaterally designate the larger parcel from which a take occurs (if severance is 
actually claimed for such portion), then the condemning authority ought not to have the ability to 
mandate what the larger parcel is simply to achieve a lower unit value for the part taken. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain speaks directly to this point: 
In assessing the value of the land taken as part of the entire tract, it 
is not proper merely to compute the percentage value on the 
basis of an artificial unit value for the entire tract, unless the 
actualities of the case accord with such an approach. It may be 
that the part taken is the most valuable part of the tract, 
considered from a qualitative point of view. To attribute an 
average unit value thereto which is based in part on the lower 
value of the balance of the tract is inequitable to the owner in a 
double aspect. It attributes a value to the part taken which is 
lower than its actual value, and its attributes a higher ultimate 
value to the remainder area than its actual value, thereby 
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reducing his recovery as to both factors below his actual 
damages. 
4 Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain§ 14.06, p. 144-146 (Revised 3d ed.) (emphasis added). 
See also, Bland v. Bulloch Cnty., 205 Ga. App. 317,320,422 S.E.2d 223, 226 (1992) (finding 
"no authority" for the proposition that the value of land taken is a pro rata value of the whole 
from which it is taken). 
In evaluating the larger parcel, courts are bound to consider the unique facts of each 
case. Contrary to ITD's arguments and the Trial Court's ruling, there is no universal "one-size 
fits all" determination of the larger parcel and Idaho law does not limit a fact finder's 
consideration of the evidence. By believing that this theory was "contrary to Idaho case law" the 
Trial Court shackled itself to an erroneous and unfair analysis. The Court flatly rejected the 
sound legal justification presented and eschewed the very concept that a larger parcel could be 
something less than the whole parent tract. 5 
5 In what could only be described as a stream-of-consciousness, the Trial Court judge at one 
point offered this monologue: "Well there are great intellectual analyses out there and in this day 
of entrepreneurs and technocrats and so on and so forth there is not limit. However, for the law, 
there are lirnits. And you are going to have the real problems with your 30-acre guy, because, 
sure, that's a fine appraisal and you can go to Google and talk with your friends on Facebook and 
it all makes good sense, and everybody-you know, your Starbucks and everything is going fine. 
But it doesn't change what the law is which is that you have to work with the 57-acre parcel. 
Sure, there is a lot of logic to it. I understand. You can draw castles in the air from here until the 
cows come home. When you value the remainder you look at the remainder what it is before and 
after the take. The remainder is the remainder. The remainder is the 41 acres. The remainder is 
not the 57 acres what you would have done. What was the 41 acres worth before the take and 
what was it worth after the take. It was not what was the 41 acres worth that was still part of the 
57 acres. That's not the way it works. I understand the intellectual gamesmanship that allows you 
to do that, but it is not legally acceptable." Tr. 2/2/2011, Vol. II Pp. 14-16, ll. 23-25, 1-19 
( emphasis added). 
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To determine the larger parcel, the trier-of-fact must consider: (1) unity of title; (2) 
contiguity; and (3) unity of use. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 
574, 468 P.2d 306 (1970). While unity of title and contiguity are important, Idaho courts have 
stated that the principal factor in the analysis is the unity of use. Id. at 581, 468 P .2d 313 
( emphasis added). Emphasis on unity of use is in accord with most other jurisdictions. 
The larger parcel analysis is a flexible concept to be applied based on the facts in 
consideration of the use, appearance of land, legal divisions (if any) and upon the intent of the 
owner. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972). In 
}.fountain Home, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that whether two pieces of land constitute 
a single (larger) parcel is a practical one for the jury to consider in light of these factors. Id. at 
532, 493 P.2d 391. Even though the properties were divided by a barrier (a ditch of considerable 
size), it was the prospective integrated use(s) of the property which controlled. The Mountain 
Home court noted that it is not the identity of uses of the condemned and remaining land which is 
determinative, rather the focus was on the dependency of the value of the remaining land upon 
its use in conjunction with the condemned land. Id. The evidence showed that the value of the 
remainder (for which severance damages were sought) was dependent upon the part condemned 
when the property was put to a prospective (future) highest/best use. Therefore, the Mountain 
Home court found that the jury's identification of the larger parcel of more than just the take area 
18 
supported a severance damage award.6 See, also State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, 
Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 468 P.2d 306 (1970) (which disregarded separation oflands [contiguity] and 
separate ownership interests in properties [unity of title] and focused instead on the unity of use). 
Admittedly, there is limited Idaho case law on the larger parcel question, but those cases 
that have addressed it recognize that unity of use is the controlling factor. Unity of use is 
necessarily the primary focus when dealing with bare, undeveloped land, as the analysis 
necessarily requires a prospective, forward thinking evaluation of the highest and best uses to 
which the properties can/may/will be put. Even ITD's valuation expert, Stanley Moe recognized 
that the prospective uses of the property controlled, when he testified that the present use of the 
property is irrelevant to determining the larger parcel because it is vacant and there is no "use" to 
consider. Tr. Vol. II, p. 317, ll. 11-15, p. 344, ll. 12-19. 
Indeed the Trial Court also recognized that under its (flawed) larger parcel treatment, 
unity of use took priority. R. at pp. 1278-1281. However, despite its recognition of the import of 
use, the Trial Court virtually ignored uncontroverted evidence and testimony on this point. The 
Trial Court specifically held there was little, if any, evidence demonstrating unity of uses 
between the eastern and western portions, but then bizarrely ruled that the unity of use "test" was 
met because the evidence indicated historical use of the entire property as bare ground. The Trial 
6 It must be noted that the issues in Mountain Home were concerned with severance damages 
accruing to the remainder not taken. The Mountain Home court did not examine the value of the 
take area in the larger parcel analysis. Instead, the case dealt with the logical inverse of the 
situation at bar. In Mountain Home, the larger parcel included property that had no contiguity 
with the parcel from which the "take" was removed, because the highest, best future use ( a golf 
course expansion) would mean the uses of the non-contiguous parcels would be unified. 
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Court did this because it simply rejected any evidence offered based on its view that Grathol's 
valuation theory was contrary to law: 
One of the big questions that I would have would be, if we were 
dealing with this case going to a jury, where we have 
determinations as to this hypothetical larger parcel based upon a 
division, just a -- just a division of the property based upon a 
speculative project that a particular individual has in mind, would 
that even go to the jury? In other words, as a matter of law, does 
the finder of fact have any evidence to support a larger 30? I 
understand the arguments, and I don't have any problem with 
the arguments, and I understand the psychology of the 
developer, and it's all correct and valid and meritorious except 
in an eminent domain proceeding. 
Tr. Vol. V, pp. 1007-1008, ll. 16-25, 1-4 (emphasis added). 
I understand the arguments, but at this point you really need a case, 
because I think you're asking --- to be honest with you, I think 
you're asking the Court to do something that is flat 
impermissible under Idaho law and is clearly reversible . ... 
Essentially, what I need is some legal authority from the defendant 
to buy their theory. I don't have - let me just say it that way. I 
don't believe I have any legal case law or any legal rationale or 
any legal support for following your theory. So I'm not saying I 
don't understand your theory. I'm not understanding --- I'm not 
saying there isn't merit to it. I'm saying this is an eminent 
domain proceeding and I just can't get there. 
Tr. Vol. V, pp. 1011-1012, ll. 2-6, 18-25, 1-2 (emphasis added). Clearly the Trial Court believed 
that Idaho law precluded consideration of Grathol's larger parcel theory. The Trial Court 
appears to recognize the merit and logic to Grathol's valuation methodology, but then rejects it 
because the property is being condemned. The Trial Court treats the Grathol property differently 
than the market would because of condemnation. The Trial Court's treatment of the Grathol 
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property is as if it now possessed less rights or value than other property, simply because it was 
under threat of condemnation. This prejudicial treatment is unsupportable. Idaho, like other 
jurisdictions, has never constrained the condemnee landowner to present valuation evidence 
based on a single approach and the Trial Court committed clear error in its approach to valuation 
of the take. 
B. THE TRIAL COURTS FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE LARGER 
PARCEL ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
At trial, the State and the property owner presented opposing views of how to calculate 
just compensation. Grathol's theory was that the western 30 acres from which the take occurred 
was an independent economic unit and that the highest and best use of that property was 
commercial/retail uses. That property had different values because of its location at the lighted 
intersection of the adjoining highways. Grathol considered the remaining 26.4 acres to the east 
as essentially surplus, and while the eventual uses of that property might also be commercial 
development of some kind, that use was not dependent upon the western 30 acres. ITD argued 
that the entire 56.8 acres must be viewed as a single unit and the highest and best use of the 
entire property is to hold for future development.7 Neither party argued that the 26.4 acre eastern 
property suffered severance damages or was impacted, in any material respect, by the take and 
7 The definition and purpose behind the highest and best use analysis is to compensate 
landowners not just for the loss of property value today, but also for the loss of value to which a 
taken property could legally be put in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is logically flawed to 
say that the highest and best use of undeveloped commercial property is to remain undeveloped 
in anticipation of some future development. It is circular. 
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construction of ITD's improvements. Similarly, neither party argued that the value of the part 
taken was dependent upon the use of the eastern 20 acres. 
The Trial Court distinguished City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (2001) 
cited by Grathol, noting that (while not controlling) in Wilson the landowner presented evidence 
of a probable zone change for the area of the take, giving it a different highest and best use than 
the rest of the parent tract. Here, the Trial Court said the highest and best use of the entire 
Grathol property was commercial/retail development. However, the Trial Court stopped short of 
finding an actual integration of such uses. Further, the Trial Court reasoned (without evidence) 
that Grathol's appraiser (Sherwood) created the 30 acre larger parcel based solely on value. In 
reaching this belief, the Court simply ignored Sherwood's testimony that the 30 acre parcel was 
dictated by market demand for commercial developments of the type contemplated by Grathol. 
For this reason, Sherwood said that the remaining property to the east was excess, and 
unaffected. The Trial Court's dismissive treatment of Sherwood's testimony as "irrelevant" was 
based on its own preconceived notion of the impossibility of a 30 acre larger parcel. The Trial 
Court also erred in its factual treatment of the Wilson case, since the highest and best use of the 
entire Grathol property was not a single integrated commercial development, but instead, just as 
with the property in Wilson, the prospective uses of the property presented were separate and 
independent uses and the underlying land held demonstratively different values based on their 
size, location, utility and proximity to adjacent roads. 
There was no dispute that the eastern 26 acres of the parent tract was unaffected by the 
take. Sherwood testified that the remainder to the east of the Sylvan extension was surplus and 
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excluded it entirely from his analysis. Alan Johnson testified that the value of the eastern portion 
remained the same both before and after the take, at $1.00 per square foot, suffering no 
severance. Tr. 3/8/12, p. 785, II. 4-5, pp. 804-05, ll. 23-25, 1-5. There was no evidence or 
argument by ITD that the eastern portion was impacted in any manner whatsoever. However, 
when valuing the area of the take, ITD happily included the entire 56.4 acre tract as the basis for 
its pro rata (averaging) valuation. 
There were differences in the opinions of the parties as to what the larger parcel was, and 
there were considerable differences in opinion of the highest and best use of the property. 
Grathol demonstrated that the highest and best use of the 30 acre western larger parcel was for 
commercial development and showed what that commercial development might look like. 
Sherwood testified that the 30 acre "economic unit" was worth $2.25 per square foot based on 
comparable property sales. Johnson testified that the 30 acres could be separated into value 
ranges based on the utility and proximity to U.S. 95. 
In opposition, ITD offered evidence that the entire property had a single uniform value 
throughout, but ITD's witnesses conceded that larger parcels sell for less than smaller parcels 
and using a larger property as the basis for value resulted in lowering the values for the take area. 
ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe recognized the impact of size on value when examining comparable 
properties: "I didn't want to go under 10 acres ... Because there's a relationship between size 
and price. As you increase the size of a property, the general relation is that the price per square 
foot ... declines." Tr. Vol. I, p. 189, ll. 15-21. When questioned by ITD's counsel on the 
impacts of valuation if you don't correctly identify the larger parcel, Moe quickly acknowledged 
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that: "It would be appraising property that - it would be misleading on the value." Tr. Vol. L p. 
145, ll. 13-15. 
Moe, however, acknowledged that a large tract of land would have greater value on the 
portions located on a highway than those portions on the rear. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 322-327. He also 
admitted that it is reasonable to assume that an equal sized property on the back end has a lower 
unit value than the front. Id. In doing so, ITD's own valuation witness admitted that the western 
30 acres possessed different values than the remainder to the east. However, Moe made no 
distinction between the front and rear of the Grathol property for his valuation. Id. at p. 326, 11. 
17-21. Instead, Moe presented a uniform value simply because he treated the larger parcel as 57 
acres for his analysis. Id. at pp. 326-27, 11. 22-25, 1-2. 
The fallacy of the Trial Court's approach to valuation of the take based on size regression 
is easily illustrated. Consider the impact of using larger or smaller comparables against a take 
area. The actual take in this case was 16.314 acres. That quantity of property has a value 
whether or not it is attached to any other property. That value is first determined without regard 
to severance, which under Idaho law requires a separate analysis. The just compensation for the 
16.314 acres taken cannot be reduced by considering its use in connection with other property. If 
the 16.314 acre take area were a stand-alone parcel, the just compensation due would be simply 
based on what a comparable 16.314 acre parcel, located on the intersection of two highways, 
would sell for on the open market. The comparables for determining this would not be based on 
the average price per acre for 57 acre tracts of land. If the value of that 16.314 acre piece is or 
approaches such size and utility to constitute an independent economic unit, its value can, and 
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should, be determined without respect to the remainder. If that value, as an independent parcel, 
is greater than the average per acre value when combined with other property, then the use of the 
averaging method unconstitutionally reduces the just compensation (for the take) to which the 
landowner is entitled. If the evidence shows that the value of the take area is $1.00 per square 
foot as a separate economic unit, and the ultimate award of just compensation for that take area is 
based on a $.50 square foot average (because larger tracts sell for less), then that owner has been 
deprived of just compensation by an impermissible and artificial reduction. This is exactly how 
the Trial Court treated the Grathol property. 
This line of thinking is endemic throughout ITD's theory of the case. In testifying on the 
value after the take, Moe testified that the remainder property had about the same square foot 
value as before the take. However, he also stated that: "So, if anything, the -- just based on the 
size differences, you would have a slight increase in the unit value." Tr. Vol. II, p. 268, ll. 14-20. 
By this logic, ITD is advocating a position that the landowner is benefitted by reducing the 
size of his property, thus leading to smaller more valuable acreage afterwards. In other 
words, "since smaller parcels are worth more per acre, and we have reduced your property size, 
we have actually increased the value of the remainder,just by virtue of taking some of it." 
This issue becomes less abstract if one considers carefully the manner in which the 
property is used, since the use will inform on whether all or just part of the property is impacted 
by the take. To answer the unity of use question in the larger parcel analysis, the Trial Court had 
to consider whether there was a prospective unity of use (i.e. - that the highest and best use of the 
land was necessarily integrated) in order to constitute a single larger tract. However, the Trial 
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Court erred speetacularly on this point. Indeed, the Trial Court's penultimate legal conclusion 
(that the larger parcel encompassed the entire Grathol property) is even unsupported by its own 
factual findings: 
At trial, ITD argued that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres 
for its commercial/retail development; however, this Court 
finds that there is insufficient evidence, if any evidence at all, in 
support of ITD's argument. Grathol's expert witness and 
appraiser Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood ("Sherwood") testified 
repeatedly that he used 30 acres because he could not find any 
instances where a commercial/retail development, that was 
comparable to the type of project he believed to be appropriate for 
the property, had needed more than 30 acres .... 
Furthermore, Grathol put in evidence that wastewater for its 
proposed project could be disposed of on-site in a number of 
different ways. 
Therefore, this Court rejects the suggestion that Grathol's 
proposed project required the easterly 26 acres in order to 
dispose of waste, because Grathol's theory for the larger parcel 
for this case was that it would not need more than the 30 acres 
to develop its commercial/retail project. 
R., at p. 1274 (emphasis added). 
The Trial Court held that ITD failed to present any evidence in support of its "unity of 
use" concept for the larger parcel determination. ITD did not introduce any evidence of a 
prospective, integrated use; ITD did not present witness testimony regarding future use; and ITD 
did not even cross-examine Grathol's engineer Jim Coleman, who testified that the wastewater 
treatment systems could be located entirely on the western 30 acres and integrated into its 
development. 
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In its Brief on Appeal, ITD repeatedly cites to a Report of David Evans and Associates 
("DEA") as factual support for its argument that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres to develop 
its property; however, that Report was not admitted at trial. Moreover, ITD did not call any 
witnesses from DEA to testify about acreage needed for development. ITD attempts to correct 
for this by citing to materials attached to an earlier Affidavit in Support of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R. at p. 510. ITD's reliance on materials not admitted in evidence at trial is 
improper. Indeed, it appears ITD had, at one point, intended to present such evidence at trial, but 
then chose not to do so. R. at pp. 1-8.8 ITD cannot now, on appeal, attempt to bootstrap its 
arguments by citing to a report not in evidence, and which the Trial Court never considered. At 
trial, the fact finder is only to consider evidence admitted at trial, consisting of testimony of 
witnesses and exhibits admitted into evidence. See, IDTI 1.00. Because ITD chose not to cross 
examine Coleman on his testimony, did not call witnesses to testify as to the integration of uses 
for the property and did not rebut Grathol' s evidence on these issues; it cannot now try to rely on 
materials not admitted in evidence to rebut Grathol' s proof. Indeed, the Trial Court's own ruling 
recognized the absence of such evidence and rejected ITD's argument of integrated use. 
There is no support for ITD's premise that the entire property was an integrated unit for 
purposes of valuing the take. Strangely, the Trial Court called Sherwood's 30 acre larger parcel 
8 The tactical decision to not call any witnesses at trial from David Evans and Associates was not 
an oversight. ITD's reasoning for this is clear, as more fully explained in the section titled 
"Severance Damages" infra, where another of ITD's witnesses, George Hedley did testify, but 
established that through his work with DEA, they determined that the cost of developing the 
Grathol property increased significantly as a result of this partial taking. In other words, proving 
(through a different valuation method) the very severance damages that Grathol argued for. 
27 
designation both "logical and credible" (R., at p. 1281), and stated that Sherwood's justification 
(for the 30 acre larger parcel) was "very logical and probably a very, very good plan." Tr. 
8/29/12, p. 42, ll. 2-6. However, despite such express findings, the Trial Court stuck with the 57 
acre larger parcel solely because of its belief that Grathol' s theory was "contrary to the law." 
There's no question that Sherwood's characterization of the 
west 30 acres and Grathol's plans for the west 30 acres was not 
screwball. I mean, it was very logical and probably a very, very 
good plan. But it would the idea would be that a landowner 
could come in and say, 'I have this plan, and, therefore it's the 
highest and best use for this particular position.' And I think 
that's directly contrary to Idaho case law, among other things. 
Id. at p. 42, fl. 3-11 (emphasis added). 
Based on the un-contradicted evidence that the property would not be integrated, one is 
hard pressed to understand how the Trial Court could simultaneously reject the suggestion that 
Grathol needed less than the entire property for its intended use, and then accept ITD's larger 
parcel argument. From the Trial Court's findings, it is evident that the Court simply disregarded 
unchallenged evidence at trial in its steadfast opposition to Grathol's theory. Rather than 
considering the prospective integrated commercial uses, of which much evidence was offered, 
the Trial Court retreated to only considering the historical use of the property as undeveloped 
land, noting that the land was uniformly zoned. R. at pp. 16-17. In doing so, the Trial Court 
ignored the intent of the landowners as to the prospective uses of the property. The Trial Court's 
ultimate conclusion as to the larger parcel is unsupported by the facts. 
The cases cited herein hold that the burden of proof is on the party asserting the 
integration ( or separation) of properties, in order to support their argument of the larger parcel. 
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These cases state that while there is a presumption that adjoining lands held by a single 
landovmer are a single larger parcel, it is a rebuttable presumption. Once that presumption is 
overcome, the burden is on the opposing party to introduce evidence to support their theory. 
Here, Grathol had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the properties were to be put to 
separate uses. Grathol put on such evidence and testimony, thereby overcoming the presumption 
of prospective unity and shifting the burden to ITD to present evidence that the lands would 
actually be integrated as a single economic unit for development. It is also clear from the 
Court's findings that ITD failed to present any evidence on this point, so ITD could not have met 
its burden. Nevertheless, the Trial Court remai..t-1ed stubbornly opposed to considering Grathol's 
larger parcel theory, as it had foreshadowed in pre-trial proceedings: 
In essence I don't see how there would be any evidence any trier of 
fact could find the larger parcel to be anything other than 57 acres. 
Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I, p. 80, ll. 8-18. That evidence was offered, but the Trial Court had preordained its 
consideration of the same. In the face of largely unchallenged evidence from Grathol's witnesses, 
the Trial Court had already decided that the larger parcel must encompass the whole of the 
property. 
There's no issue with regard to the larger parcel, as the Court 
originally conceived of a larger parcel. Maybe its 56.8 or maybe it's 
56.4, but to neither valuation expert did that make a bit of difference 
so it's basically, that's the larger parcel. 
Tr. Vol. IV., pp. 688-90, ll. 23-25, 1-3. Despite noting that ITD presented no evidence to support 
its theory of "unity of use," the Trial Court simply adopted ITD's argument because it ruled 
Grathol's theory was barred by law. Once the Court decided that the larger parcel was the entire 
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property, it proceeded to disregard the valuation estimates and severance damage evidence from 
Grathol because that evidence was also based on the rejected smaller parcel theory, thus the legal 
error was exponentially compounded. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF ZERO SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Contrary to ITD's arguments, Grathol is not asserting "new" claims for severance damages. 
Rather, Grathol is appealing the Trial Court's decision of "zero severance damages" as being 
unsupported by the clear weight of the evidence, including evidence offered by ITD's own 
witnesses. The Trial Court's conclusion on severance damages is difficult to comprehend. For 
example, GeoffReeslund testified that the western portion of the Grathol property suffered damages 
by reason of ITD's take and the construction of the new highway interchange. Reeslund testified 
that the cost of extending utilities to the westernmost portion, which (solely by reason of ITD's 
construction) is now physically severed from the eastern portion, will approach $1,000,000, more 
than the total value of the 3.87 acres which would be served by those utilities. Prior to the take, the 
property was contiguous with no barriers to placing utility infrastructure throughout the property. 
After the take, however, the new highway interchange prevented the extension of those utilities. 
Because of the interchange, additional costs are required to provide utilities to the west 3.87 acres. 
This is not some discrete independent basis for an award of severance damages as ITD 
claims, but instead those costs impacted the value of the western remainder after the take. 
Reeslund's testimony bolstered Alan Johnson's testimony as to the value of the property before and 
after. The utility costs were factored in as a component of severance damages in Johnson's 
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valuation, when he opined that the value of the remainder after the taking and testified that 
severance damages were between $338,000 and $798,000. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 813-815. Grathol did 
not present a line-item list of costs/severance damages, nor is it required to do so. However, Grathol 
was entitled to give evidence of severance damages and Reeslund provided testimony showing how 
the property was damaged by reason of the take. Johnson encapsulated these damages in his 
testimony as to the remainder values. 
However, the Trial Court either ignored or forgot, or overlooked this testimony, as well as 
that of one of ITD' s expert witnesses, when it concluded that there was "no evidence" of severance. 
Again, like the :fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree effect, the Trial Court seems to have disregarded 
evidence and found Johnson's valuation testimony not credible simply because it was based on 
"Johnson's reliance on the larger parcel being 30 acres." R. at p. 1295. 
Similar to its treatment (or, more accurately, its non-treatment) of Reeslund's testimony, the 
Trial Court likewise did not even address the direct and rm-contradicted testimony of one of ITD's 
expert witnesses, George Hedley. This omission is critical, and why on appeal, ITD understandably 
seeks to downplay Hedley's testimony.9 
George Hedley was identified by ITD as an expert witness who would opme on the 
economic feasibility of developing the Grathol property. Specifically, Hedley was hired to critique 
Grathol's development plans and offer testimony on why the plans were not feasible. Quite simply, 
he was employed to explain the numbers; and he did. Hedley testified that the development costs 
9 Hedley's testimony also explains ITD's decision to forego offering evidence at trial from David 
Evans and Associates as more fully discussed at page 28, herein. 
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required of Grathol after ITD's take for the remaining property increased by $1.98 per square foot, 
when compared to the development costs required of Grathol for the same prospective development 
had the take not occurred. ITD now attempts to dismiss this testimony as insignificant: 
It is not surprising, or significant for purposes of Grathol 's severance 
damage argument that the per square foot value testified to by 
Hedley for Grathol's development costs after the Project was greater 
than the costs before the Project. The reason for the increased cost 
was not because the Project made the development more expensive, 
but rather because there was less property belonging to Grathol after 
the Project. 
rID's Brief at p. 53. That is not what Hedley testified to, but even if it was, that is the~ 
definition of severance damages. "The damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned." See, Idaho Code 
§ 7-711 (2). ITD claims that the increased development costs were caused because there is now less 
land available, which is because of ITD's take. It's the quintessential description of severance 
damage. However, ITD simply shrugs this off, claiming that Hedley' s testimony cannot be used to 
justify an award of severance damages. Which begs the question: Why not? The Idaho and US 
Constitutions protect the landowner's right to just compensation for a taking and for injury to his 
remaining property regardless of the source of the injury. Further, Hedley's testimony served to 
discredit ITD's other valuation witnesses who claimed there were zero severance damages. 
However, the Trial Court inexplicably failed to address or even mention Hedley's testimony 
which was un-opposed and un-contradicted! To the Trial Court, it's as if such testimony didn't 
exist, like the proverbial tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it. The Trial Court committed 
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clear, reversible error in ruling there was no evidence of severance damages. Hedley's testimony 
proved otherwise, just as did Reeslund' s and Johnson's. 
The Trial Court's finding of no severance damage is utterly unsustainable. The Trial Court 
either ignored or missed ITD's own offering. Because the Trial Court totally failed to address this 
uncontested testimony from ITD demonstrating severance damages, its conclusion was clearly 
erroneous and must, in the interest of justice, be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
GRATHOL'S VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. 
ITD misrepresents the Sylvan Road issue, arguing that Grathol's evidence on the impacts 
of Sylvan Road would created a separate, line item of damages. That was not the purpose or 
point of the excluded evidence. Grathol understood that ITD was not physically condemning 
Sylvan Road ( at this time), and that it could not recover damages for a take, because the take had 
not (yet) occurred. The Trial Court ruled at summary judgment that it could not award 
compensation for the taking of Sylvan Road because it was not being condemned. However, the 
Trial Court simultaneously ruled that the impact to the remainder of the Grathol property, of 
having Sylvan Road extend through the property in the future, was "not irrelevant." Tr. 212/12, 
Vol. I,pp. 16-17, ll. 18-25, 1-12. 
At trial, however, ITD vociferously opposed any testimony about Sylvan Road, claiming 
it was precluded because Grathol did not have a "separate and discrete value" for the damages. 
Tr. 3/8/12,pp. 801-802, ll. 8-25, 1-22. 
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ITD willfully misconstrued the purpose of Johnson's testimony concerrung Sylvan. 
Grathol was not offering evidence of the impacts of the Sylvan Road extension in order to make 
a separate claim for damages. Grathol was (trying) to establish that the project related 
influences, including the future requirement to extend Sylvan, affected the value of the 
remainder. Evidence of how the inevitable extension of Sylvan Road through the property 
impacts the fair market value of the remainder is relevant to damages. The Trial Court had 
previously acknowledged this, but at trial, and upon ITD's urging, the Trial Court then limited 
and virtually precluded Johnson from testifying how the Sylvan Road dynamic impacted his 
opinions on value. All relevant evidence informing on the value of the property is admissible in 
a proceeding to determine just compensation. That has always been the law. Grathol conceded 
that its claims for severance damages were incorporated into the "before" and "after" valuation 
testimony of its witnesses. There was never going to be testimony of a line-item of damages 
associated with Sylvan Road. However, the impacts of an eventual Sylvan Road extension go 
beyond the mere dirt value of the road corridor or costs of construction. ITD's project made the 
extension of a frontage road through Grathol's property, a foregone conclusion. This much was 
even recognized by the Trial Court. Tr. 2/2/12, Vol. I, p. 16, ll. 3-17. 
At trial, Grathol attempted to question Alan Johnson as to how extending Sylvan Road 
impacted his valuation opinion. 
Q. [Mr. Marfice] Mr. Johnson, if Sylvan Road crosses through the 
property ... regardless of how or when it happens, does that impact 
your use of the property? That's all I'm asking yes or no. 
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Ms. York: Same objection Your Honor. It's not part of this case. 
ITD is not alleging it as part of this case, and he doesn't have any 
claims for damages as a result of any future construction of Sylvan 
Road. 
The Court: Well, I'll let it go with just a yes or no, as afar as if the 
answers only yes or no. If he adds something else, it's going to get 
stricken. 
Tr. 3/8112, p. 802, ll. 12-25. Johnson answered in the affirmative, that the Sylvan Road 
extension does impact the use of the property, but no further explanation was allowed. 
The Trial Court erred in precluding Johnson frorn explaining how a Sylvan Road corridor 
extension impacted the property and how it impacted the property's highest/best use and thus its 
value. The Trial Court precluded Johnson frorn providing credible support for his value and 
severance damage opinions. In precluding this testimony, the Trial Court had already effectively 
decided that Johnson would be testifying to a separate itern of damages which was not the intent 
of the questions. Then, compounding the error, in its Decision, the Trial Court criticized 
Johnson's testimony as factually unpersuasive, unexplained and "confusing." R. at pp. 1293, 
1294. It should hardly be surprising that the testimony seemed confusing when the Trial Court 
refused to hear the foundational basis for the testimony. The Trial Court failed to consider and 
appreciate that the Sylvan Road related testimony was being offered to support Johnson's 
opinions of value, as previously disclosed. That testimony was both admissible and necessary to 
assist the Court in understanding how Grathol's damage calculations were achieved. 
The subject testimony was never intended to support a discrete claim for damages for a 
Sylvan Road taking. It was offered as support for understanding what the impacts of ITD's 
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project on the remainder of the property. The Trial Court committed reversible error in 
preventing Grathol from offering this evidence, and it bound itself to a hopelessly incomplete 
body of evidence upon which to decide the valuation question. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AW ARD ING COSTS AND 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS TO A CONDEMNOR. 
This Court has repeatedly held that Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides the exclusive basis for 
awarding attorney's fees in actions involving state entities. This Court has even held that ruling 
in this very case. State, Dep't of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 278 P.3d 957 (2012). Tr. 
8/29/12, pp. 35-36. The Trial Court reasoned that the Section 12-117 "standard" (acting without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law) serves as guidance to applying the Acarrequi10 standards for 
determining the prevailing party. 
The Trial Court noted that the main issue in the case was the larger parcel question. Tr. 
8/29 at p. 39. The Court then held that, while in its view, Grathol's larger parcel theory was 
unsupported because the law "really isn't there," nevertheless, Grathol's theory was "novel and 
creative and certainly pushing the envelope." Id. at pp. 40, 45. The Trial Court specifically ruled 
that Grathol's efforts weren't unreasonable and that under the criteria of Section 12-117 an 
award of fees to ITD under Idaho Code § 7-71 7 was unjustified. Id. at p. 49. The Trial Court, 
therefore, found that the remaining analysis under Acarrequi was moot because the condemnor 
failed to show the absence of any reasonable basis in fact or law for the condemnee' s actions. Id. 
10 Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. By & Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 
1067 (1983). 
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However, the Trial Court took a different track with respect to awarding costs, because 
costs "seem" to be awarded in condemnation actions under HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334, 282 
P.3d 595 (2012). Id. at p. 50. The Trial Court departed from its consideration of Idaho Code § 
12-117 as "guidance" and returned to a "prevailing party" analysis under LR.C.P. 54(d)(l), 
without giving consideration to the reasonableness of Grathol's defense. The Trial Court ruled 
that ITD was a prevailing party under Acarrequi because the Court's final award of just 
compensation was lower than ITD's last communicated offer prior to trial. 
The Court erred in its treatment of Acarrequi and Idaho case law as providing support for 
an award of costs to a condemnor as a prevailing party in their case-in-chief. 
In Acarrequi, this Court examined a trial court's award of attorney's fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-121 and costs under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5) to a condemnee. Acarrequi created a new 
standard governing both attorney's fees and costs only as it relates to a condemnation 
proceeding. Id. at 875, 673 P.2d 1069. The Acarrequi Court recognized that Idaho Code § 7-
718, as interpreted, requires the condemnor to pay all costs. Id. at 876, 673 P.2d 1070 (citing, 
Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P .2d 722 (1931 ); Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 
26 Idaho 37, 141 P. 74 (1914)), but held that while fees and costs are allowable under I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l), they are not mandatory to the condemnee in all circumstances. Nothing in Acarrequi 
even implies that fees may be awarded to the coµdemnor. 
The Acarrequi Court recognized that the prior standard for an award of fees to a 
condemnee would have required the condemnee to show that the action was brought by the 
condemnor unreasonably or without foundation, and that it would be seldom that a government 
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entity could be shovvn to have initiated a condemnation action frivolously. Id. at 876-877, 673 
P .2d 1070-1071. Therefore, in order for a condemnee to recover fees, the Acarrequi Court 
reasoned that a condernnee's recovery would be based on the condmenor's failure to make a 
reasonable offer of settlement in a timely fashion. 
As to costs, Acarrequi recognized that F.R.C.P. 54 did not apply to condemnation 
proceedings. Since the condemnor is normally the prevailing party, and should not recover its 
costs against the property owner, the general rule which provides for costs to the prevailing party 
is inapplicable in condemnation proceedings. 11 
This Court concluded: 
We now hold that an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the 
condemnee in an eminent domain action is a matter for the trial 
court's guided discretion and, as in other areas of the law, such 
award will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse. We 
further hold that the condemnee's costs may be awarded under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) or 54(d). 
Id. at 878, 673 P.2d 1072 (emphasis added). Finally, the Acarrequi Court enumerated several 
factors to be considered in an award of fees/costs to the condernnee and remanded the trial 
court's "automatic" award in light of the new factors, including an analysis of whether the 
ultimate award of just compensation was within 90% of the condernnor' s timely pre-trial offer of 
settlement. 
11 The Acarrequi Court cited to the committee notes to F.R.C.P. 71A, finding that "costs of 
condemnation proceedings are not assessable against the condernnee unless by stipulation he 
agrees to assume some or all of them." Id. at 877, 873 P.2d 1071, citing 6A Nichols on Eminent 
Domain§ 27.6 (3d ed. 1981) (emphasis added). 
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The impact of Acarrequi is that this Court crafted a specific standard for an award of fees 
and costs to the condemnee. Acarrequi does not, however, stand for the proposition that a 
different analysis is utilized when considering fees as opposed to costs. Rather, the award of fees 
or costs to the condemnee must be treated the same. "Since we have held that an award of 
attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnee in a condemnation proceeding lies within the discretion 
of the trial court, it is appropriate that we delineate some factors which the trial court should 
consider in exercising that discretion." Id. at 876, 673 P.2d 1071 (emphasis added). There is 
nothing in Acarrequi to suggest that a bifurcated analysis be utilized to determine an award of 
costs separate from an award of fees. 
Here, for some inexplicable reason, the Trial Court departed from its recognition ofldaho 
Code § 12-117 as a limitation on an award of fees and awarded costs to ITD. The Trial Court 
committed legal error when it failed to apply the same standard in considering an award of costs 
to the condemnor. In doing so, the Trial Court also significantly departed from the long line of 
cases holding that in condemnation proceedings, costs are borne by the condemnor. Bassett v. 
Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931); Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 
37, 141 P. 74 (1914). Those cases have not been abrogated or overruled and are binding 
precedent, which the Trial Court simply ignored in awarding costs to ITD. The Trial Court 
committed legal error in applying the Acarrequi standards against a condemnee to justify 
awarding costs to ITD, and created an entirely new standard. The Acarrequi Court provided no 
analysis of the propriety or constitutionality of awarding of costs or attorney's fees to a 
condemnor, nor did it elaborate on its " ... we cannot envision an award of attorney's fees and 
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costs to a condernnor" dicta. The Trial Court here similarly did not undertake any reasoned 
analysis of such an award, and it erred in ignoring binding Idaho precedent to award costs to 
ITD. 
ITD argues in its Brief that costs have been awarded to condernnors "a number of times" 
including two times to ITD itself, citing Grathol I and !TD v. HI Boise, LLC, 153 Idaho 334,282 
P.3d 595 (2012). ITD also cites Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 26 P.3d 
1225 (Ct.App. 2001) in support of their argument. ITD presented the same cases to the Trial 
Court in support of its argument; however, in these cases, the condemning party was awarded 
costs only on appeal. Costs are awarded as a matter of course to the prevailing party on appeal 
under I.A.R. 40, not I.R.C.P. 54. In none of these cases were costs ever awarded to a condernnor 
as a prevailing party in the underlying action. The Trial Court failed to recognize the distinction. 
If costs had ever been awarded to the condemning party under Acarrequi or its progeny, or under 
Idaho Code § 12-117 or § 7-718; ITD would have seized upon such case and presented it as 
support. However, the absence of any such cases, in Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, is telling. 
The Trial Court's reliance on these cases for an award of fees under I.R.C.P. 54 is unsupported. 
It is instructive to consider the federal treatment of costs and fees in condemnation 
proceedings. F.R.C.P. 71.1(1) applies to condemnation proceedings and provides simply that 
costs are not subject to F.R.C.P. 54(d). The Committee Notes to subdivision (1) states: "Since 
the condemnor will normally be the prevailing party and since he should not recover his costs 
against the property owner, F.R.C.P. 54(d) which provides generally that costs shall go to the 
prevailing party is made inapplicable." While Idaho does not have a Rule 71.1(1) equivalent, the 
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federal rule treatment recognizes that a condemnor would ordinarily be considered a prevailing 
party (having successfully condemned the property) and that costs should not be assessed against 
a condernnee under F.R.C.P. 54. 
The same essential legal error by the Trial Court should also have precluded the award of 
$11,000 as discretionary costs to ITD as a prevailing party. However, assuming arguendo that 
discretionary costs to a condemnor were permissible, the Trial Court chose to award those costs 
simply because Pines' appraisal was helpful. Being "helpful" evidence doesn't make it 
necessary or exceptional under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) standards. The statements by the Trial 
Court as to the "helpfulness" of Pines' appraisal do not substitute for the required finding that the 
discretionary cost award must be both necessary and exceptional. IR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). In 
rationalizing the award of discretionary costs for the appraisal of Pines, the Trial Court even 
noted that part of the reason for the award was based on problems with ITD's own initial 
appraisal (by Stanley Moe) which the Trial Court characterized as "low ball". Tr. 8/29/12 at p. 
57. 
And having the second appraiser come in, who frankly seemed a 
little bit more straightforward than either of the other appraisers 
and certainly was more comprehensible than Sherwood - was 
really very, very helpful to the Court in terms of providing some 
basis for what the Court feels is a really credible value. 
Id. The Trial Court justified the award of expert fees for Pines basically because his testimony 
was more credible than the other appraiser witnesses, including ITD's appraiser. In the absence 
of Pines' report, presumably the Trial Court would have had to rely solely on the other valuation 
witnesses to arrive at its award. The fact that ITD's own appraiser presented a "low-ball" value 
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should not mean that the expense of a second appraisal was either necessary or exceptional, and 
should certainly not mean that the expense is attributable to the condernnee. Any "necessity" for 
Pines' work was created, at least in part, by ITD's own strategy in presenting a low ball 
valuation that was not credible. The only thing exceptional about the need for ITD to employ a 
second appraiser to testify was the fact that ITD' s first appraisal was deficient, and awarding the 
additional expense against Grathol is unconscionable and unsupported. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DECLINING TO AW ARD ITD ATTORNEY FEES UNDER LC.§ 12-117. 
ITD cross-appealed the Trial Court's denial of its request for attorney's fees. ITD sought 
fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 7-718 and "Idaho case law governing the award of costs 
and fees in condemnation cases." R. at pp. 1316, 1321, 1351. At oral argument on ITD's motion, 
ITD clarified that it was not seeking fees under Section 12-121, but rather under the 
"particularized rules for costs and attorney's fees that applies to condemnation cases." Tr. 8129 at 
p. 5. ITD did not request fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. Grathol objected to ITD's request for 
fees based on Idaho cases holding Idaho Code § 12-117 as the "exclusive basis" for an award of 
fees in actions involving government entities and ITD's failure to move for fees under Section 
12-117, arguing that the court was not empowered to award fees on a basis not asserted by the 
moving party. Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999). 
Despite objection, the Trial Court treated ITD's fee request under Idaho Code § 12-117. 
Appellate review of an award of fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-11 7 is subject to an abuse 
of discretion standard. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). On 
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appeal, ITD does not present argument that the Trial Court abused its discretion, declining to 
award fees. 
Instead, ITD continues to argue that Idaho Code § 12-117 does not apply to the instant 
condemnation action, despite this Court's express holding in Grathol I, Randel and Potlatch 
Educ. Ass'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 184 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010). While this 
Court has not expressly defined "exclusive" in the context of these cases, it is difficult to 
understand what other meaning "exclusive" has, other than as the "single" or "sole" basis for an 
award of attorney's fees to a state entity. Recently, this Court applied Idaho Code § 12-117 to 
inverse condemnation actions as well. See, Alpine Vil!. Co. v. City of Mc Call, 39580, 2013 WL 
2663852 (Idaho June 14, 2013). 
Still, ITD continues to ignore these holdings, arguing that Idaho Code § 7-718 provides a 
basis for an award of fees to a condemnor when fees are treated as costs. While it is not disputed 
that Idaho cases have allowed attorney's fees as costs to a condemnee under Section 7-718, there 
are simply no cases that have allowed a condernnor fees (or costs) under Section 7-718. 
ITD relies on a tortured and misguided interpretation of Acarrequi and its progeny, 
arguing that these cases establish that a condemnor may be awarded attorney's fees. ITD appears 
to recognize that Acarrequi altered the prior analysis of fees and costs to a condemnee, but then 
ITD seeks to extend the same factors in reverse for an award of fees to a condemnor. In doing 
so, ITD completely ignores the Acarrequi Court's reasoning for tailoring the prevailing party 
analysis for a condemnee in order to avoid the undue hardship of forcing a landowner to 
demonstrate that the action was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Id. at 
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876-877, 673 P.2d at 1070-71. The Acarrequi Court found that this burden was too great since it 
would seldom be the case where a condernnee could demonstrate that the condemnor's actions 
were frivolous. 
None of the cases relied on by ITD support its argument. None of those cases dealt with 
the propriety or constitutionality of a fee award against a landowner. Instead, ITD seizes upon 
dicta in Acarrequi. ITD relies on this isolated statement that encompasses the entirety of Idaho's 
jurisprudence on the propriety of fees to a condernnor. As noted above, that statement appears in 
Acarrequi without any real analysis or context and was made in the course of setting out new 
standards for an award of costs and fees to a condernnee. Absent any discussion or analysis, that 
statement alone cannot create a right to fees against the condernnor, especially when the 
Acarrequi Court recognized that prior case law required costs to be borne bv the condernnor 
under Idaho Code§ 7-718 -the very statute ITD seeks fees under. 
It has been almost universally recognized that condemnation proceedings are not ordinary 
litigation. The landowner finds himself in court through no fault of his own and forced to incur 
expenses to recover just compensation for the government's unilateral taking of his/her property. 
There is a split of authority as to whether a condernnee's costs and attorney fees should be 
considered as constitutionally required "just compensation" when the inevitable result is that 
costs and fees will reduce the compensation ultimately received. Indeed, early Idaho law 
mandated the award in order to ensure that the landowner was made whole. However, there are 
no cases in Idaho or anywhere else that have held that the condemnor' s costs and fees can be 
awarded against a landowner. If that were to occur, the award of a condernnor' s attorney's fees 
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would be set-off against the constitutionally protected just compensation and could even result in 
the perverse result (here) of the landowner owing money to the condemnor. That would be a 
perversion. 
The only reported case which Grathol has located dealing with this issue is City of 
Westminster v. Hart, 928 P.2d 759 (1966), where the Colorado Court of Appeals soundly 
rejected this approach. In Hart, the trial court denied the City's request for costs after the verdict 
of just compensation was less than the City's offer of settlement. Id. at 759. The trial court held 
that the statute relied upon by the City12 was inapplicable in condemnation actions. The City 
appealed the denial of its claim. On appeal, the Hart court found that it was presumed that when 
the General Assembly enacted Colorado's condemnation statutes, it intended compliance with 
the State Constitution. The Colorado Constitution, provides Gust as does Idaho's) in Article II § 
15, that "private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just 
compensation."13 Id. The Constitution protects an owner's right to full compensation for an 
involuntary taking by a governmental agency. Hart states that requiring the owner to pay the 
City's costs would violate the owner's rights to just compensation. Id. According to the Hart 
court: 
To hold otherwise would result in the owners rece1vmg less 
compensation than specified by the board of commissioners. Such 
a result is prohibited by Colo. Const. art. II, § 15, which 
exclusively authorizes a board of commissioners or a jury to 
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. Am. § 13-17-202(l)(a)(II) was similar to I.R.C.P. 68 for an offer of judgment. 
13 Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be 
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefore. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14. 
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determine the amount of just compensation. (Internal citations 
omitted) 
Therefore, we reject the city's contention that § 13-17-
202(1)(a)(II) applies to condemnation proceedings in which the 
final judgment is less than the amount of the city's offer of 
settlement. 
Id. Like the City of Westminster, ITD seeks to have Grathol'sjust compensation award reduced 
by the amount of its own costs and attorney's fees, which, not coincidentally, exceed the amount 
of the award by a 2 to 1 margin. The result would be to completely offset the just compensation 
award and end with Grathol owing money back to the State. That result would be 
constitutionally abhorrent. 
A condemnation proceeding is an action provided for by the Idaho Constitution, not the 
legislature. Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 222, 596 P.2d 75, 94 (1978), affirming State ex rel. 
Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 943, 500 P.2d 841, 844 (1972). 14 While the Legislature is 
granted the right to establish the procedures for determining just compensation, it does not have 
the ability to intrude upon or reduce the constitutionally required just compensation. Since a 
condemnee's right to just compensation is protected by Idaho's Constitution, the Legislature 
cannot infringe on that right by providing any mechanism that will reduce or even eliminate that 
14 An eminent domain proceeding is not an ordinary 'civil' action wherein the factual issues are 
submitted to a jury for determination. Historically, eminent domain action was ex parte and 
inquisitorial in the common law and has not been regarded as a civil remedy. Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, ss 1.1-1.44 (3d rev. ed.). The power of eminent domain arises as an incident to 
sovereignty of the state with this authority recognized by the state constitution. Idaho Const. Art. 
1, s 14; Portneuf Irrig. Co., Ltd. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046 (1909). The procedures for 
eminent domain actions have been established by the legislature. Idaho Code, Title 7, Ch. 7. 
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award. Any interpretation to the contrary would be unconstitutional. Similarly, the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits the taking of private property for 
public use without just compensation. US. Const., amend V The Fourteenth Amendment 
applies this obligation to the states. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
While Idaho law has moved away from automatically awarding a condemnee fees and 
costs, this is a far cry from ITD's argument that a condemnee's just compensation may be 
reduced or even eliminated by awarding costs and fees back to the condemnor. There is simply 
no support for such an argument, in Idaho or elsewhere, and none of ITD's cases demonstrate 
otherwise. 
ITD's argument that Idaho Code § 7-718 allows for costs and fees to a condemnor, is 
juxtaposed against this Court's repeated pronouncements that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the 
"exclusive basis" for fees in actions involving state entities and presents a potential conflict 
between the statutes. When confronted with a statutory construction or interpretation question, it 
is incumbent upon the court to ascertain the legislative intent and to examine the public policy 
and legislative history in order to ascertain the meaning of the provisions in question. State v. 
Locke, 149 Idaho 641,642,239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct.App. 2010) 
The Idaho Legislature codified the rules pertaining to condemnation actions. Idaho Code 
§ 7-711A requires a condemnor to provide an advice of rights form to landowners prior to 
beginning negotiations. Idaho Code § 7-711A requires the form disclosure to include the 
following mandatory language when advising landowners of their rights: 
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(8) The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time 
during the acquisition process. In cases where the condemning 
authority condemns the property and the owner is able to establish 
that just compensation exceeds the last amount timely offered by 
the condemning authority by ten percent ( 10%) or more, the 
condemning authority may be required to pay the owner's 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The court will make the 
determination whether costs and fees will be allowed. * 15 
Idaho Code§ 7-711A (emphasis added). This mandatory disclosure became law on July 1, 2000 
and its language has not changed since adoption. ITD utilizes the same language in its Advice of 
Rights Form. See, Appendix A. 
Of import here is that this mandatory disclosure does not inform a landowner that if they 
fail to beat the condemning authority's last offer then they could be liable for the condemnor's 
costs and attorney fees. Instead, the advice of rights form only speaks to an award of costs and 
fees to the landowner. This distinction is crucial when considering the reasoning behind the 
required disclosure in the first place. 
The Statement of Purpose for Senate Bill No. 1515 provided that: 
Idaho citizens may not be aware of their legal rights when there is 
a potential taking of their property by eminent domain. This statute 
is intended to provide notice to the property owners of their 
individual rights in explainirig the condemnation process. This bill 
is intended to give full and fair notice to the property owner of 
what their rights are at the beginning of any condemnation process 
as provided for under the laws of the state of Idaho. 
Senate Bill No. 1515, as amended, as amended, Statement of Purpose. See, Appendix A. 
Although this legislative enactment was made 27 years after the Acarrequi decision, it was 
15 * This is a codification to give notice to property owners of the Acarrequi rule. 
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intended to fully and fairlv apprise landowners of their rights in condemnation proceedings. 
However, absolutely nothing in the disclosure provides any indication to a condemnee that they 
could be liable for the condernnor's fees and costs as ITD claims. The Legislature is presumed 
to know the law when it enacts legislation and the absence of any notice to the landowner in this 
required advice of rights form shows that a condemnee cannot be held responsible for a 
condemnor's fees or costs if it fails to "beat" the condemnor's offer. If the law in Idaho, as 
interpreted through Acarrequi were otherwise why is there no disclosure of this potential 
exorbitant liability in the advice of rights form? The answer is simple: Idaho law does not allow 
for fees and costs to be imposed on the condemnee. 
The legislative history of this provision shows that Idaho's law makers were very aware 
of abuses and misrepresentations made by agents of the condemning authorities. The sponsor of 
Senate Bill No. 1515, Senator Grant Ipsen, also introduced a related Senate Bill (No. 1429). In 
that parallel Bill, the Statement of Purpose provided: 
Idaho citizens are not being made aware of their legal rights when 
they are faced with the taking of their property by eminent domain. 
Government right of way agents or negotiators tell the owners that 
they are not entitled to compensation for various items which the 
law of Idaho does not provide compensation for, they tell the 
owners that if they do not sell willingly, they could be held 
responsible for the government's costs and attorneys fees, and they 
refuse to provide owners with a copy of the appraisal report upon 
which the government's offer is based. There is currently no 
remedy for this conduct on the part of the government and no 
protection for citizens, even when the conduct rises to the level of 
bad faith. In some cases the representations of the right of way 
agents or negotiators clearly constitute unauthorized practice of 
law which has gone unregulated. 
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This bill is designed to ensure that Idaho citizen faced with 
condemnation are made aware of their rights under existing State 
law. The bill does not create any new rights and will not cost Idaho 
taxpayers any additional money. The effect would be to protect 
citizens from unscrupulous strong-arm negotiation tactics as well 
as innocent misrepresentations made by misinformed right of way 
agents. Citizens cannot exercise rights they are not aware they 
have; it is only fair that when the government is taking their private 
property they are advised of the constitutional protections and 
limitations they are entitled to under our system of laws. 
Senate Bill No. 1429, Statement of Purpose. See, Appendix A. These concerns were considered 
by the Idaho Legislature in enacting Idaho Code§ 7-711A, and demonstrate an intent to codify 
and disclose the landowners rights, including Acarrequi 's treatment of fees and costs to the 
condemnee. The misrepresentations of right-of-way agents telling landowners that they could be 
found liable for fees and costs was an abusive tactic considered in enacting Section 7-71 lA. If 
there were any support for ITD's present position, then clearly the Legislature would have 
provided for a disclosure to property 0\\1Ilers of the potential liability. However, the Legislature 
did not, and the advice of rights form remains the same today. Its purpose is to advise 
landowners of protections and limitations at the outset of condemnation negotiations. 
Because Idaho law does not support an award of attorney's fees to a condemnor under 
Acarrequi or its progeny, ITD's argument is frivolous and unsupported. The Trial Court exercised 
its discretion in denying ITD attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117 and ITD' s cross-appeal 
should be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Grathol respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of 
the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. Grathol requests costs on appeal pursuant to 
I.A.R40(a). 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day ofJuly, 2013. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
1 stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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:i___usMail 
1 Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
I 
PROPERTY OWNER 
ADVICE OF RIGHTS FORM 
In accordance with Idaho Code 7~711A, 7s711, and 54-4105(5} 
(1) The Stale of Idaho,, ldaho Transportation Oepartrnent, by and through, the 
Idaho Transportation Bo~rd, (Stelle) has the power under the constitution and the 
laws of the state of Idaho and the United States to fake private property for public 
use. This power is generally referred to as the power of "eminent domain" or 
condemnation. The power can only be exercised when: 
a} The property is needed for a public use authorized by Idaho law; 
b) The laking of the property is necessary to such t1se; 
c) The taking must'be located in the manner which will be most compatible 
with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
(2) The State must negotiate With the property owner ih good faith to purchase 
the property sought to· be taken and/or to settle with the owner for any other 
damages which might result to the remainder of the QVv'her's property. 
(3) Th.e owner of private property to be acquired by the State is entitled to be paid 
for any diminution. in the value of the ovVne.r's remaining property which is caused 
by the, taking and the use. of the property taken proposed by the condemning 
authority. This· compensation, called "severance damages," is genetally 
mea$U[ed by compa,ring the value of the property before the taking and the value 
of the property after the taking. Damages are assessed according to Idaho 
Code. 
(4) The value of the property to be taken is to be determined based upon the 
highest and besf use of the property. 
(5) If the negotiations to purchase the property and settle damages are 
unsuccessful, the property oWner is entitled to assessment of damages from a 
coµrt, jury or referee as provided by Idaho law. 
(6) The owner has the right to consult With .ah appraiser of the owners choosing 
at any time during the actjuisifion process at the owner's cost and expense. 
(7) Th~ State shall delivet to the owner, upon 'request,. a copy oJ all apprais~I 
reports' ooncething the owner's property preparEld by th~ State., Once a compJailit 
for condf3TT1natio!"I is filed, the Idaho rules of civil procedure control the disclosure 
of appraisals, 
(£1:) In some cases authorized by Idaho Code a: value estimate can be substituted 
for an appraisal. A value estimate is an accepted an¢! leg9Uy approved tnethoct 
to valu~ prop$tly when the cqn)Pensati:dn fot the requiremenf ,is ~10,000 or les.s'. 
Ali value esthnates are 'i'eViewed and' approved by an ,Idaho, certified general n:ral 
estate appraiser. A valt1e e::..titnate ,.must be proyicfed to an owner, .If an owner 
dQ~S 11qt accep\'ct Value estirnate, he is entitled to ah apprai$al by an agent of the 
,,Idaho Transportation Department ~eque.sts for an appraisal in lieu of a value 
Elsthnat~ shoukf b~ $Ubmifted to the Jdaho Ttalispdrti':ttiori Deparlmeht Within 3{? 
d~ys of receipt of this· notice and sent to: ldaho Transpprtqtjqn Oepartmfmt, Right 
ofWay SectioJl; Attn: Apprais,al Coordinator, P.O, Bax 7129. Boise,ldaho'83707. 
(9) The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time, during the 
acquisition process, In cases in which the State condemns property and the 
owner is able to establish that just compensation exceeds the last amount timely 
offered by the State by ten percent{10%) or more, the condemning, authority may 
be required to pay the owner's reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The court 
will make the determination whether costs and fees wilt be awarded. 
(10) The form contemplated by this section shall be deemed delivered by United 
State;; certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the person or persons shown 
in the official records of the county assessor as the owner of the property. A 
second copy will be attached to the appraisal at the time it is delivered to the 
owner: 
(11) If the State desires to acquire property pursuant to this chapter, the State or 
any of its agents or employees shall not give lhe owner any timing deadline as to 
when the owner must respond to the initial offer which is less than thirty (30) 
days. A violation of the provisions of this subsection shall render any action 
pursuant to this chapter nuH a'nd void. 
(12) Nothing in this section changes the assessment of damages set forth ln 
section T-711; Idaho Code. 
(13) If a business has been in existence for five years or more and is owned by a 
party whose lands are being condemned and the business is located on those 
l,rnds. ot upon adjoining land$ owned or held by the same party, then the owner 
of the' bustness may be entitled to damages to fhe business, (A tenant, b:Usiness 
owner does not qualify.) A business owner has the right to consult with an 
attorney, 
The business owner has the burden of making a claim by sending it certified mail 
return receipt requested to the Idaho TransportaUon Department, Legat Section, 
P.O. Box 7129_, Boise, Idaho 83703 no later than 90 days after service of the 
summons and complaint for condemnation on the property owner. The business 
damages claim must be clearly segregated from a claim for property damages 
and cannot duplicate damages paid for land or for severance' damages. The 
business owner, a CPA, or a business damage expert, must prepare the daim. 
The claim must include an explanation of the nature, extent and monetary 
amquntof damages and be supported by copies of federal and state income tax 
returns, state sales tax returns, balance sheets, profit and loss statements and 
any other records relied upon for five preceding years:, 
No business damages wm be awarded if the loss. can tet;isonably be prevented 
by a rejocation of the business or by taking steps that" a, reasonably, prudent 
person wottl~:f take.1 No pµsin~ss -~~ages will b~, p~id for ternpo@ry-' Qijsin~s,s 
interwptton due to construction. · 
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IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1515, As Amended, As Amended 
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO EMINENT DOV,AIN; ~-MENDING CHAPTER 7, TITLE 7, IDAHO CODE, BY THE 
ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 7-711A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE REQUIRED DUTIES 
OF A STATE OR LOCAL UNIT OF GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC UTILITY THAT IS BEGINNING 
NEGOTIATIONS TO ACQUIRE A PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY IN FEE SIMPLE UNDER THE 
STATE'S EMINENT DOMAIN LAW, TO PROVIDE A FORM TO ADVISE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 
OWNERS, TO PRODUCE A METHOD OF DELIVERY OF SUCH FORMS AND TO PROVIDE 
APPLICATION. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Chapter 7, Title 7, Idaho Code, be, and the same hereby 
amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and designated 
as Section 7-711A, Idaho Code, and to read as follows: 
7-711A. ADVICE OF RIGHTS FORM RIGHTS WHEN CONDEMNING AUTHORITY 
ACQUIRES PROPERTY. Whenever a state or local unit of government or a public 
utility is beginning negotiations to acquire a parcel of real property in fee 
simple, the condemning authority shall provide the owner of the property a 
form containing a summary of the rights of an owner of property to be acquired 
under this chapter. If the condemning authority does not supply the owner of 
the real property with this form, there will be a presumption that any sale or 
contract entered into between the condemning authority and the owner .was not 
voluntary and the condeITu.~ing authority may be held responsible for such 
relief, if any, as the court may determine to be appropriate considering all 
of the facts and circumstances. The form shall contain substantially the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The (name of entity allowed to use eminent domain proceedings pursu-
ant to chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code) has the power under the constitution 
and the laws of the state of Idaho and the United States to take private prop-
erty for public use. This power is generally referred to as the power of 
"eminent domain" or condemnation. The power can only be exercised when: 
(a) The property is needed for a public use authorized by Idaho law; 
(b) The taking of the property is necessary to such use; 
(c) The taking must be located in the manner which will be most compati-
ble with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
(2) The condemning authority must negotiate with the property owner in 
good faith to purchase the property sought to be taken and/or to settle with 
the owner for any other damages which might result to the remainder of the 
owner's property. 
(3) The owner of private property to be acquired by the condemning 
authority is entitled to be paid for any diminution in the value of the 
owner's remaining property which is caused by the taking and the use of the 
property taken proposed by the condemning authority. This compensation, called 
"severance damages," is generally measured by comparing the value of the prop-
erty before the taking and the value of the property after the taking. Dam-
2 
l ages are assessed according to Idaho Code. 
2 (4) The value of the property to be taken is to be determined based upon 
3 the highest and best use of the property. 
4 (5) If the negotiations to purchase the property and settle damages are 
5 unsuccessful, the property owner is entitled to assessment of damages from a 
6 court, jury or referee as provided by Idaho law. 
7 (6) The owner has the right to consult with an appraiser of the owner's 
8 choosing at any time during the acquisition process at the owner's cost and 
9 expense. 
10 (7) The condemning authority shall deliver to the owner, upon request, a 
11 copy of all appraisal reports concerning the owner's property prepared by the 
12 condemning authority. Once a complaint for condemnation is filed, the Idaho 
13 rules of civil procedure control the disclosure of appraisals. 
14 (8) The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time dur-
15 ing the acquisition process. In cases in which the condemning authority 
16 condemns property and the owner is able to establish that just compensation 
17 exceeds the last amount timely offered by the condemning authority by ten per-
18 cent (10%) or more, the condemning authority may be required to pay the 
19 owner's reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The court will make the determi-
20 nation whether costs and fees will be awarded. 
21 (9) The form contemplated by this section shall be deemed delivered by 
22 United States certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the person or per-
23 sons shown in the official records of the county assessor as the owner of the 
24 property. A second copy will be attached to the appraisal at the time it is 
25 delivered to the owner. 
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26 (10) If a condemning authority desires to acquire property pursuant to 
27 this chapter, the condemning authority or any of its agents or ewployees shall 
28 not give the owner any timing deadline as to when the owner must respond to 
29 the initial offer which is less than thirty (30) days. A violation of the pro-
30 visions of this subsection shall render any action pursuant to this chapter 
31 null and void. 
32 (11) Nothing in this section changes the assessment of damages set forth 
33 in section 7-711, Idaho Code. 
Amendment 
AS1515 
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Moved by Wheeler 
Seconded by Hawkins 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1515 
1 AMENDMENT TO SECTION l 
2 On page 1 of the printed bill, in line 14, following "property" insert: 
3 "in fee simple". 
4 
5 
CORRECTION TO TITLE 
On page 1, in line 5, following "PROPERTY" insert: "IN FEE SIMPLE". 
Moved by Ipsen 
Seconded by Frasure 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1515, As Amended 
6 AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1 
7 On page 1 of the engrossed bill, in line 39, delete "also". 
8 On page 2, in line 19, following "owner's" insert: '{reasonable"; in line 
9 21, following nbe" insert: "deemed"; and in line 28, delete "an" and insert: 
10 "the initial". 
Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Impact 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 10185 
Idaho citizens may not be aware of their legal rights when there is a 
potential taking of their property by eminent domain. This statute is intended tc 
provide notice to the property owners of their individual rights in explaining the 
condemnation process. This bill is intended to give full and fair notice to the 
property owner of what their rights are at the beginning of any condemnation 
process as provided for under the laws of the state of Idaho 
FISCAL IMPACT 
The only fiscal impact would be the printing of the notices. 
Contact 
Name: Senator Grant Ipsen 
Phone: (208) 332-1326 
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IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1429 
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE 
Jl..N ACT 
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN; AMENDING CHAPTER 7, TITLE 7, IDAHO CODE, BY THE 
Jl..DDITION OF A NEW SECTION 7-711A, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE REQUIRED DUTIES 
OF A STATE OR LOCAL UNIT OF GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC UTILITY THAT IS BEGINNING 
NEGOTIATIONS TO ACQUIRE A PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY, TO PROVIDE PRESUMPTIONS, 
TO PROVIDE FORMS, TO PROVIDE PROCEDURES, TO PROVIDE RIGHTS OF OWNERS OF 
PROPERTY AN::l TO PROVIDE FOR PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH IN NEGOTIA-
TIONS AND TO PROVIDE THE EFFECT ON DAMAGES. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Chapter 7, Title 7, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be known and des-
ignated as Section 7-711A, Idaho Code, and to read as follows: 
7-71IA. ADV1CE OF RIGHTS FORM -- RIGHTS WHEN GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC UTILITY 
WANTS PROPERTY. Whenever a state or local unit of government or a public util-
ity is beginning negotiations to acquire a piece of real property, the entity, 
government or public utility shall provide the owner of the property a form 
containing the following information. If the government or public utility does 
not supply the owner of the real property with this form, there will be a pre-
sumption that any sale or contract entered into between the government or 
utility and the owner was not voluntary and the government or utility may be 
held responsible for such relief, if any, as the court may determine to be 
appropriate considering all of the facts and circumstances. The form shall 
contain substantially the following: 
(1) The (name of entity allowed to use eminent domain proceedings pursu-
ant to chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code) has the power under the constitution 
and laws of the state of Idaho and the United States to take private property 
for public use. This power is generally referred to as the power of "eminent 
domain" or condemnation. The power can only be exercised when: 
{a) The property is needed for a public use pursuant to section 7-701, 
Idaho Code; 
(b) The taking of the property is necessary; 
(c) The taking will cause the greatest public good and the least private 
injury; 
(d) The government or public utility has negotiated with the property 
owner in good faith in an attempt to acquire the property through volun-
tary sale and purchase; and 
(e) "Just compensation• for the taking has been ascertained and paid pur-
suant to section 7-711, Idaho Code. 
12) The owner of private property to 
public utility is entitled to be paid for the 
which are taken. The government or public 
be acquired by the government or 
property and property rights 
utility must pay the fair market 
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42 value of the pro?e::ty and prcperty rights. The government or public ut-ility 
43 will not be required to pay more than any other fully knowledge.able buyer in 
2 
1 the open market and ~ill not be allowed to pay less than any other 
2 knowledgeable buyer in the open market. 
3 (3) The value of the property to be taken is to be detennined based on 
the highest and best use of the propertyr which may differ from its current 
5 use. For example, if property is zoned for commercial use but is currently 
6 used for agricultural purposes, the value of the land to be taken may be based 
7 on commercial use rather than agricultural. 
8 (4) The owner of the property to be acquired by the government or a pub-
9 lie utility is also entitled to be paid for any diminution in the value of the 
iO owner's remaining property which is caused by the taking and the use of the 
11 property taken proposed by the government or public utility. This compensa-
12 tion, called nseverance damages," is generally measured by comparing the value 
13 of the property before the taking and the value of the property after the tak-
14 ing. Damages are assessed according to section 7-711, Idaho Code. 
15 (5} The owner has the right to consult with an attorney at any time dur-
16 ing the acquisition process. In cases in which the government or a public 
17 utility condemns property and the owner is able to establish that just compen-
18 sation exceeds the last amount timely offered by the government or public 
19 utility by ten percent (10%) or more, the government or public utility may be 
20 required to pay the owner's costs and attorney's fees. The court will make the 
21 determination whether costs and fees will be awarded or not. 
22 (6} The owner has the right to consult with an appraiser of his or her 
23 own choosing at any time during the acquisition process at his or her own 
24 expense. 
25 (7) The owner has the right to obtain a copy of all appraisal reports, 
26 prepared by the acquiring agency's or the utility's appraiser upon request. 
27 (8) The owner is generally not responsible for the legal fees of the gov-
28 ernment or public utility if a lawsuit is filed to acquire the property via 
29 eminent domain. 
30 (9) If the owner and the government or utility cannot agree as to the 
31 amount of just compensation due for the property, the owner has the right to 
32 have the issue determined either by the court or a jury. 
33 (10) If a government or utility desires to acquire property pursuant to 
34 this chapter, the government or utility or any of its agents or employees 
35 shall not give the owner any timing deadline as to when the owner must respond 
36 to an offer which is less than sixty (60) days. A violation of the provisions 
37 of this subsection shall render any action pursuant to tr~s chapter null and 
38 void. 
39 (11) Failure by the government or·utility to give the owner of the prop-
40 erty the form required by this section shall be prima facie evidence of bad 
~1 faith in negotiations. 
42 (12) Nothing in this section changes the assessment of damages set forth 
43 in section 7-711, Idaho Code. 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact 
ST.RTEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS09926 
Idaho citizens are not being made aware of their legal rights when they are faced 
with the taking of their property be eminent domain. Government right of way agents or 
negotiators tell the owners that they are not entitled to compensation for various items 
which the law of Idaho does not provide compensation for, they tell the owners that if 
they do not sell willingly, they could be held responsible for the government's costs and 
attorneys fees, and they refuse to provide owners with a copy of the appraisal report upon 
which the government's offer is based. There is currently no remedy for this conduct on 
the part of the government and no protection for citizens, even when the conduct rises to 
the level of bad faith. In some cases the representations of the right of way agents or 
negotiators clearly constitute unauthorized practice of law which has gone unregulated. 
This bill is designed to ensure that Idaho citizens faced with condemnation are 
made aware of their rights under existing State law. The bill does not create any new 
rights and will not cost Idaho taxpayers any additional money The effect would be to 
protect citizens from unscrupulous strong-arm negotiation tactics as well as innocent 
misrepresentations made by misinformed right of way agents. Citizens cannot 
exercise rights they are not aware they have; it is only fair that when the government is 
taking their private property they are advised of the constitutional protections and 
limitations they are entitled to under our system of laws. 
FISCAL IMPACT 
The only fiscal impact would be the printing of the notices. 
Contact 
Name: Senator Grant Ipsen 
Phone: (208) 332-1327 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE 
'L-t4--.//1 ..... _;,...1_,,,_ ___ !.J_L _ ____ /1 __ ,!_1_.t.~--- /t"\Af"\A/n1 Al""\/"\ 1--"----
Page2of2 
Sl429 
